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Evidence. Donovan v. Bowling, 706 A.2d 937 (R.I. 1998). In a
medical malpractice action, a treating physician's expert testimony
is accessible to both the plaintiff and the defendant. The patientphysician privilege does not apply when a plaintiff brings a medical liability action against the health care provider and her treating physicians. Furthermore, a treating physician is
distinguishable from an expert retained solely for litigation purposes; in that a physician is similar to an eyewitness, who will testify based upon his/her personal observations while treating the
patient.
In Donovan v. Bowling,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court was
faced with the question of whether plaintiffs counsel, in a malpractice action, could retain a treating physician as an expert where
the defendant's counsel had previously retained as an expert witness. 2 There exists no superior court rule that would prohibit3
counsel from interviewing any prospective trial witness ex parte.
Therefore, both sides to a medical-malpractice action are entitled
to the access of a treating physician's firsthand observations. 4 Furthermore, in cases where the plaintiff, who is also the patient,
seeks to retain the same treating doctor as the defendants retained
for an expert witness, the patient-physician privilege is not
implicated.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On April 25, 1990, Diane Donovan (Diane) gave birth to Nicole
E. Donovan (Nicole) at Women and Infants Hospital in Providence,
Rhode Island. 5 Nicole suffered from neurological complications at
birth, which resulted in her eventual death on May 5, 1994.6 Her
parents believed the actions of the hospital and medical attendants
were the proximate cause of Nicole's death.7 They subsequently
brought a medical-negligence malpractice action against Women
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

706 A.2d 937 (R.I. 1998).
Id. at 940.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 938.
See id.
See id.
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and Infants Hospital of Rhode Island and several treating
physicians. 8
On May 10, 1993, counsel for the defendants contacted Dr.
Constance Bowe, a pediatric neurologist, who had been one of Nicole's treating physicians, and advised her that he would like to
discuss the case with her.9 A meeting did not take place at that
time, but rather on June 8, 1993, a paralegal from defendant counsel's firm sent Dr. Bowe a copy of Nicole's records.' 0 Subsequently,
on June 24, 1993, defense counsel sent Dr. Bowe a copy of Diane's
medical records following a telephone conversation." Defense
counsel allegedly included with the medical records a compilation
of facts derived from the medical charts and records, the parties
allegations and assertions, and defense counsel's research of the
highlights of the case. 1 2 Dr. Bowe engaged in two half hour telephone conversations with the paralegal at defense counsel's firm,
during which time, she expressed favorable opinions to the defend13
ant's position.
On August 3, 1994 and November 1, 1994, defense counsel
sent letters to Dr. Bowe advising her of the upcoming trial dates in
which he planned to present her testimony; however, Dr. Bowe
later denied receiving both letters. 14 On April 17, 1996, plaintiffs
counsel informed defense counsel that they had contacted Dr.
Bowe for the purpose of presenting her testimony at trial. 15 Defense counsel informed plaintiffs counsel that he had previously
engaged Dr. Bowe as an expert, was planning to present her as a
defense witness, and in a subsequent letter, informed plaintiffs
counsel that Dr. Bowe recalled her involvement with the
16
defendants.
Defense counsel sought to exclude Dr. Bowe's expert testimony
on the grounds that she had already entered into a confidential
8. See id.
9. See id. While the parties did not dispute that Dr. Bowe was one of the
treating physicians, they did dispute the amount of care the doctor provided to
Nicole following her birth. See id. at 939 n.1.
10. See id. at 939.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
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relationship with him on behalf of several of the defendants. 17
However, Dr. Bowe denied having been retained by defense counsel, or receiving the August 3, 1994 letter.' 8 Dr. Bowe could not
recall exchanging any confidential information with the paralegal,
or receiving any information other than what was contained in the
medical records.19
The trial justice inferred a confidential relationship between
defense counsel and Dr. Bowe, and as a result granted defense
counsel's motion in limine to exclude Dr. Bowe's testimony. 20 The
plaintiffs filed their appeal with the Rhode Island Supreme
21
Court.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Patient-PhysicianPrivilege
The trial justice concluded that a confidential relationship between Dr. Bowe and defense counsel could be inferred. 22 The
supreme court held that the trial justice's decision to disqualify Dr.
Bowe was in error, based upon the court's prior holding in Lewis v.
Roderick.23 The Lewis court permitted defense counsel to engage
in ex parte communications with the plaintiffs treating physician
even though the plaintiff had previously retained the physician to
testify as her expert.2 4 The court, in Lewis, acknowledged the
existence of a patient-physician privilege found in the Health Care
Information Act, codified in the Rhode Island General Laws, but
pointed to an exception for medical malpractice actions. 25 Since
the Lewis plaintiff had brought a medical malpractice action
against the health care provider and her treating physician, the
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 940.
20. See id. at 939-40. The trial justice concluded that regardless of her wellmeaning intentions, Dr. Bowe "'compromised her integrity to testify as an expert,'"
and as a result she was disqualified. Id.
21. See id. at 940.
22. See id.
23. 617 A.2d 119 (R.I. 1992).
24. See Donovan, 706 A.2d at 940.
25, See id. (citing Lewis, 617 A.2d at 121 (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37.34(b)(8) (1956) (1995 Reenactment))). The statute provides an exception to the protections afforded by the patient-physician privilege in a "'medical liability action
against a health care provider.'" Id.
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court concluded that she was not entitled to invoke the patient26
physician privilege.
Unlike the situation in Lewis, the issue in Dononvan was not
whether the defendant could speak ex prate to a treating physician, but whether the plaintiffs could retain, as an expert, a treating physician, who defendants allegedly had previously retained as
an expert. 2 7 The court held that this case did not implicate the
privilege, because it only existed between Nicole and Diane-also
the plaintiffs-and the treating physician. 28 The court also noted
that Dr. Bowe submitted an affidavit, in which she indicated that
she did not consider herself retained by defense counsel as an expert witness, but rather that he had requested that she review the
medical records of Nicole in the capacity of a "treating physician." 2 9 Therefore, pursuant to Lewis, there was nothing to pro30
hibit the plaintiffs from calling Dr. Bowe as their witness.
Expert Opinions
The supreme court has acknowledged that there are times
when an expert opinion may be protected from pretrial disclosure;
however these instances are distinguishable from those in which a
party seeks disclosure of facts that a witness to an occurrence has
observed. 3 1 While an expert retained for litigation purposes may
sometimes be considered part of the "litigation team," a treating
physician is more akin to an eyewitness who has observed a situation while treating the patient.3 2 The court observed that no Superior Court rule exists that would prohibit ex parte communications
between counsel and prospective trial witnesses, or that would set
forth sole methods of pretrial discovery in order to obtain pertinent
information. 33 Hence, the court stressed that a witness' first hand
observations are discoverable by both parties, and distinguished
26. See id. at 940.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 940 n.2.
30. See id. at 940.
31. See id. at 941 (citing Cooper v. Housing Auth. of Newport, 249 A.2d 904,
907 (R.I. 1969)).
32. See id.; see also Irvine v. Inn at Castle Hill, Inc., 670 A.2d 1263, 1263 (R.I.
1996) (stating that the search for facts and truth do not permit the monopoly of a
witness). See Donovan, 706 A.2d at 941 n.3.
33. See id. at 940 (citing Lewis v. Roderick, 617 A.2d 119, 122 (R.I. 1992)).
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such testimony from that which espouses a theory of the case de34
veloped by a litigation expert.
The court further held that to bar another party from access to
the physician's first-hand perspective would be unfair to the litigants. 3 5 Citing a prior decision, the court distinguished the opinions and conclusions of an expert, which are in essence evidence
necessary to establish the material facts of a case, from the attorney's impressions or conclusions protected by the work-product
doctrine. 36 The court reasoned that any contradictory statements
that Dr. Bowe may have made to defense counsel's paralegal may
be brought to light by effective methods of impeachment during
37
cross-examination.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court applied its precedents in determining that a plaintiff may retain a treating physician to testify
as an expert on their behalf, regardless of whether the defendant
had previously consulted with the physician. The court also determined that such a scenario did not invoke the patient-physician
privilege, because the privilege could only exist between the patients, not defendants, and the treating physician. Even where the
privilege could be invoked, it did not apply within the context of
medical liability actions against a health care provider. Thus, the
court concluded that a treating physician is more akin to an eyewitness, whose first-hand observations are discoverable by both
parties to the litigation.
Jennifer L. Brooks

34. See id. at 940-41.
35. See id. at 941.
36. See id. at 941 n.4 (citing Town of North Kingstown v. Ashley, 374 A.2d
1033, 1037 (R.I. 1977)).
37. See id. at 941-42.
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Evidence. Sheeley v. Memorial Hospital,710 A.2d 161 (R.I. 1998).
In a medical malpractice case, any medical expert with the proper
knowledge and familiarity with the alleged malpractice can testify
as to the relevant standard of care.
In Sheeley v. Memorial Hospital,' the Rhode Island Supreme
Court was faced with the question of what the appropriate standard of care is in medical malpractice cases. 2 The court abandoned
the "similar locality" rule in favor of a national standard. 3 A medical doctor, with the proper knowledge or familiarity with the procedure, acquired through experience, observation or education, is
competent to testify regarding the proper standard of care. 4 The
doctor need not be situated in the "same or similar" locality with
the alleged malpractice. 5
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Joanne Sheeley (Sheeley) delivered a healthy child at Memorial Hospital on May 19, 1987.6 In conjunction with the delivery,
Dr. Mary Ryder, a second-year family practice resident, performed
an episiotomy on her. 7 This procedure is designed to prevent tearing during the delivery, and requires a cut into the perineum of the
patient.8 After the delivery was over, Dr. Ryder repaired the episiotomy by stitching the cut previously made in the perineum.9 Mrs.
Sheeley was discharged from the hospital soon afterward.' 0
Shortly after her discharge, Sheeley began to have complications from this procedure." She developed a rectovaginal fistula,
which consists of an opening between the vagina and the rectum. 12
This required correctional surgery, which was performed. 13 HowL. 710 A.2d 161 (R.I. 1998).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 163.
See id. at 167.
See id. at 166.
See id.
See id. at 163.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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ever, Sheeley continued to suffer from pain following the surgery. 14
Sheeley then filed suit for medical malpractice against the hospital, Dr. Ryder and Dr. Brian Jack, the faculty member responsible
for the supervision of Dr. Ryder. 15
At trial, Sheeley attempted to introduce the testimony of a
medical expert, Dr. Stanley D. Leslie, a board certified obstetrician/gynecologist.' 6 Dr. Leslie intended to testify regarding the
proper standard of care in performing an episiotomy. 17 The defendants filed a motion in limine to exclude Dr. Leslie from testifying, saying that he was not qualified to testify under section 9-1941 of the Rhode Island General Laws.' 8 The trial justice granted
this motion. 19 Sheeley did not have another expert witness, and
was unable to obtain one within the two days that the trial justice
provided. 20 The defendants then filed a motion for a directed verdict, which was also granted. 2 1 Sheeley appealed, claiming that the
trial justice committed error by excluding Dr. Leslie from testifying, since he was a qualified witness. 2 2
BACKGROUND

In Rhode Island, the traditional test that has been used in determining whether a medical expert can testify regarding the
proper standard of care has been the "same or similar locality"
rule. 2 3 According to the court, "[tihis rule requires that experts be
from similarly situated communities as the defendant in order to
testify regarding the proper standard of care."2 4 This rule came

from the old "strict locality" rule, which requires that the expert be
from the same community as the defendant. 25 The rationale be14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.; see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-19-41 (1956) (1994 Reenactment) (specifying the requirements necessary for expert testimony in the area of malpractice).
19. See id. at 164.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 166 (citing Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 682 n.5 (R.I.
1972)).

24. Id.
25. See id. at 165 (citing Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Assoc., 349
A.2d 245, 248 (Md. 1975)).
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hind this rule was that opportunities, experiences, and conditions
differ between heavily populated areas and lightly populated
26
areas.
However, this rule was criticized because it provides a lower
standard of care in smaller communities and because it does not
consider the conspiracy of silence among members of the plaintiffs
27
community that would preclude obtaining expert testimony.
Therefore, many jurisdictions abandoned this rule, and adopted
the "same or similar locality" rule.

28

ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Initially, the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that the determination of the competency of a witness is within the trial justices discretion, and that the decision of the trial justice will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of clear error or abuse. 29 The
court held that the trial justice did abuse her discretion and com80
mitted reversible error by excluding Dr. Leslie from testifying.
In making this determination, the court looked at Marshall v.
Medical Associates of Rhode Island.3 1 In Marshall, the court was
faced with the question of whether section 9-19-41 of the Rhode
Island General Laws requires that a medical expert be board certified or otherwise have training or experience in the same medical
specialty as the defendant. 3 2 The court said that there is nothing
in the statute that suggests that in order to qualify as an expert,
the doctor must be board certified or otherwise have the training or
experience in the same specialty as the defendant.3 3 As long as the
expert has the knowledge, skill, expertise, or education in the same
field as the alleged malpractice, the expert should be allowed to
testify.3 4 The court also limited the decision in Soares v. Vestal,36
by saying that Soares only stands for the proposition that an ex26. See id.
27. See id. at 165-66 (citing Shilkret, 349 A.2d at 249).
28. See supra note 23.
29. See Sheeley, 710 A.2d at 164 (citing Richardson v. Fuchs, 523 A.2d 445,
448 (R.I. 1987)).
30. See id. at 164.
31. 677 A.2d 425 (R.I. 1996).
32. Id.
33. See id. at 426.
34. See id. at 426-27.
35. 632 A.2d 647 (R.I. 1993).
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pert with board certification in one area of medicine is not automatically qualified to testify at trial. 36 The expert must still have
the requisite knowledge, skill, training, or experience in the same
37
field of the alleged malpractice.
The Sheeley court agreed with this reasoning by saying that
the appropriate standard of care "should not be compartmentalized
by a physician's area of professional specialization or certification."38 The focus should be on the procedure performed and
whether or not it was performed by the relevant standard of care. 39
A physician with the proper knowledge with the procedure acquired through experience, observation, skill, or education is competent to testify regarding the appropriate standard of care. 40 The
court also said that except in extreme cases, an expert who is board
certified in a particular specialty related to the procedure in question, should be presumptively qualified to testify. 41
The court further ruled that the traditional locality rule is no
longer applicable "in view of the present-day realities of the medical profession."42 Factors such as vastly superior training, the
proliferation of medical publications and the growing availability
of modem clinical facilities have combined to produce higher standards that are much higher than before, and are also national in
scope. 43 Therefore, the traditional "same or similar locality" rule is
no longer applicable.
Finally, the court said that in enacting section 9-19-41 of the
Rhode Island General Laws, the Legislature did not include any
language regarding the "similar locality" rule. 44 The court con-

cluded that "this omission amounted to a recognition of a national
scope to the delivery of medical services." 45

36. See Marshall,677 A.2d at 427.
37. See id.
38. Sheeley, 710 A.2d at 166.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. See id. (quoting Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Assoc., 349 A.2d
245, 252 (Md. 1975)).
44. See Sheeley, 710 A.2d at 166-67.
45. Id. at 167.
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CONCLUSION

In a medical malpractice case, an expert witness with the
proper knowledge or familiarity with the medical procedure, may
testify at trail regarding the appropriate standard of care. The
traditional "same or similar locality" rule, which limited expert testimony to those physicians who are from similarly situated communities, has been abandoned in favor of a national standard. A
physician is under a duty to use the degree of care that is expected
of a reasonably competent physician in the same class, acting in
the same or similar circumstances.
Ryan M. Borges
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Evidence. State v. Sharp, 708 A.2d 1328 (R.I. 1998). In criminal
actions, the prosecution and defense counsel are entitled to a
meaningful cross examination of any witness presented throughout the course of criminal proceedings. Under Rule 804 of the
Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, former testimony is admissible if
the party against whom it is now being offered had an opportunity
to pursue such testimony by direct or cross-examination.
In State v. Sharp,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court was faced
with the question whether the defendants' counsel were given adequate opportunity to cross-examine a now-unavailable witness,
who gave prior testimony at a bail hearing. 2 If adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness was denied, the trial court must
rule that the prior sworn testimony of the witness is admissible at
trial. 3
FACTS AND TRAVEL

The defendants, Carl Sharp (Sharp) and Che Gallman
(Gallman), were accused of the murder of Levert Hill (Hill).4 In
the early morning of April 1, 1996, Michael Franks (Franks) was
driven to his home by Hill. 5 Franks heard gunfire as he exited the
vehicle, and as he turned to the shot's direction, he witnessed a
blue Corsica with two passengers leaning out of the opened windows brandishing weapons.6 Franks later identified the defend7
ants as the two men in the blue Corsica that evening.
The defendants were arrested and charged with murder.8 A
bail hearing was held in Providence County Superior Court at
which Franks testified.9 After the bail hearing and prior to the
1. 708 A.2d 1328 (R.I. 1998).
2. Id. at 1329.
3. See id. at 1331.
4. See id. at 1329. The defendants were also charged with conspiracy to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, unlawfully discharging a firearm
from a motor vehicle, carrying a pistol in a vehicle without a license, and possession of a firearm after having been previously convicted of a crime of violence. Id.
at 1329
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.

n.1.
See id. at 1328-29.
See id. at 1329.
See id.

See id.
See id.
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defendants' trial, Franks was shot and killed. 10 In response to
Franks' death, each defendants counsel individually filed motions
in limine to exclude Franks' testimony at the defendants' bail hearing from being introduced at trial."
Counsel for both defendants argued that they were denied an
adequate opportunity for meaningful cross-examination because
they lacked some specific information that would have altered the
way they had conducted their examination of Franks at the bail
hearing. 12 The trial justice granted the defendants' motion in
13
limine.
In granting defendants' motion in limine, the trial justice
found that Franks was not subjected to adequate cross-examination during the bail hearing because defense counsel lacked certain
relevant impeachment materials.14 The defense attorneys claimed
that information of Frank's history of drug use and his failure to
comply with court-ordered drug treatment were not made available prior to the defendants' bail hearing. 15 Defense counsel also
contended that the prosecution refused to admit that they had
made a deal with Franks not to pursue a prior violation in exchange for testimony against the defendants. 16
The trial judge held that the absence of this information denied defendants their right to a meaningful cross-examination of
Franks and, furthermore, he ruled that the bail hearing testimony
was inadmissible at trial. 17 After the exclusion order was issued
by the trial judge, the state appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme

10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 1330.
13. See id.
14. See id. Specifically, the trial judge noted that defense counsel were not
made aware of the full extent of Franks' criminal history, or with the fact that

Franks had previously used aliases. Franks was convicted in the State of Ohio of
several crimes, including drug trafficking, criminal trespass, and receiving stolen
property. See id. at 1330 n.3.

15. See id. at 1330.
16. See id.
17. See id.
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Court.' 8 The supreme court held that the defendants were not denied an adequate opportunity for meaningful cross-examination. 19
BACKGROUND

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution expressly affords a defendant the right of confrontation. 20 This right
of confrontation has been read to guarantee an accused the right to
effective cross-examination of any witness. 2 1 "[Tihe opportunity
for adequate cross-examination forms the cornerstone of the defendant's right to confront his or her accusers, a defendant's right
to confrontation is not offended by the admission at trial of prior
testimony of an unavailable witness if that defendant was afforded
the opportunity for adequate cross-examination during the prior
hearing."2 2 Article I, section 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution
23
also guarantees the right to effective cross-examination.
Furthermore, Rule 804 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence
provides a hearsay exception for former testimony. 24 Rule
804(b)(1) states that "[tihe following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness ... [riecorded
testimony given as a witness at a another hearing of the same or a
different proceeding ...if the party against whom the testimony is
now offered . . .had an opportunity to develop the testimony by
direct, cross, or redirect examination."25 This prior sworn testimony may be admissible if the unavailable witness' testimony can
be shown to have been evoked "in the course of a prior judicial proceeding in which the [defendants were] present, represented by
counsel, and in the course thereof provided with an opportunity to
18. See id. at 1329. "This case came before the Supreme Court on March 2,
1998, pursuant to an order directing all parties to appear and show cause why the
issues raised by this appeal should not be summarily decided." Id. at 1329. The
court ruled that cause had not been shown and all issues would be summarily
decided. See id.
19. See id. at 1329.
20. See State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921 (R.I. 1980) (stating that the United
States Constitution's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation guarantees an accused the right to an effective cross-examination).
21. See id.
22. Sharp, 708 A.2d 1328, 1329-30 (quoting State v. Ouimette, 298 A.2d 124,
131 (R.I. 1972)).

23. R.I. Const. art. I, § 10.
24. R.I. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (1994).
25. Id.

728 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:605
adequately cross-examine the witness."28 The adequacy of the
prior cross-examination depends on the identification of the issues
27
and parties by the parties to the proceeding.
ANALYsIs AND HOLDING

The defendants did not claim the trial judge severely limited
their cross-examination, but claimed that the lack of information
at the bail hearing deprived them of their opportunity to cross examine Franks adequately. 28 The court acknowledged that previous testimony may be inadmissible under Rule 804(b)(1) if it was
limited by defense counsel's lack of information; however there was
29
no finding of that here.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that "[the linchpin of
any cross-examination is the presentation of competent evidence
that either contradicts the witness' account or impeaches the witness' credibility."30 The court found that the record reflects that
there was sufficient information for defense counsels to conduct an
adequate cross-examination.3 1
32
The court addressed each of defense counsels' assertions.
First, the assertion that the prosecution negligently withheld information of Franks' criminal record was rebutted by Franks' own
admission during the bail hearing that he was a convicted felon. 33
The admission was given by Franks but no further inquiry was
made by defense counsels during the bail hearing.3 4 This failure of
further inquiry was not the negligence of the prosecution but was
35
simply a failure to inquire by defense counsels.
Second, defense counsels claimed that they were misled by the
prosecution in reference to any "inducements or rewards that the
Attorney General may have provided to Franks in exchange for his
26. Sharp, 708 A.2d at 1329 (quoting Ouimette, 298 A.2d at 130).
27. See id. at 1330. The Ouimette court explained that the rule to follow is
"the so-called liberal rule, which requires only a substantial identity of issues and
parties in order to permit the introduction of prior testimony of the unavailable
witness at the subsequent proceedings." Id. (quoting Ouimette, 298 A.2d at 131).
28. See id. at 1330.
29. See id.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
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testimony against the defendants." 36 The prosecution denied the
existence of a deal with Franks in exchange for his testimony, and
the trial court was unwilling to decide this issue. 3 7 Whether such
a deal with Franks was in place or not in no way affected the ability of the defense attorneys to confront Franks on the issue at the
bail hearing. 38
CONCLUSION

Based on the facts presented, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
determined that the trial judge abused his discretion in excluding
Franks' bail hearing testimony. 3 9 The court sustained the state's
appeal and vacated the order to exclude Franks' testimony from
the defendants' trial.4 The court did state that the defendants
were free to attack Franks' credibility at trial, by the use of evidence of Franks' convictions in Ohio and his use of and treatment
for drugs. In essence, that fact that defense counsel did not fully
cross-examine the witness was of no fault of the prosecution, but
was simply from insufficient inquiry on the part of defense
counsels.
Tyler J. Savage

36. Id.

37. See id. at 1331. The existence of a quid pro quo arrangement is circumstantial and insufficient to render the bail hearing testimony inadmissible. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
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Evidence. State v. Webber, 716 A.2d 738 (R.I. 1998). Under
Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 702, even though expert testimony
may be helpful to the trier of fact, such testimony still requires a
foundation in order to be admissible.
In State v. Webber,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court was
faced with determining the necessary foundation for the admissibility of testimony from an arson detecting dog, the state's expert
at trial. The court held that adequate foundation for testimony
concerning the dog's arson-detecting abilities required the state to
establish the expertise of the dog's curator, produce evidence regarding the dog's background and training, and testimony regard2
ing the dog's accuracy during investigations.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On September 13, 1990, at approximately 1:30 p.m., Christine
Webber (Webber) returned to her home in Coventry, Rhode Island
from a business meeting she attended in Massachusetts that
morning. 3 After attending to some personal matters, she left her
residence and proceeded to drive to her place of business, C. Webber Chevrolet. 4 Webber, while a short distance away from her
home, encountered her son, Frederick Webber (Frederick) and his
friend, Jeffrey Raymond (Raymond). 5 After a brief conversation,
6
the parties continued on their respective ways.
Frederick and Raymond, as they approached the house, noticed smoke rising from the roof.7 A neighbor informed them that
the fire department had already been notified.8 Apparently, someone also placed a call to Webber, informing her of the situation at
her home. 9 After receiving this phone call, she turned her car
around and arrived at her home just moments after the fire
trucks.' 0
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

716 A.2d 738 (R.I. 1998).
See id. at 741 (citing State v. Buller, 517 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Iowa 1994)).
See id. at 739.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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It was later concluded by those investigating the incident that
"the fire had been caused by a deliberate human act."1 Further
investigation also revealed the presence a flammable substance,
apparently used to ignite the fire in two separate locations within
the home. 12 Investigators also noticed that the home's fire-detection system had been manually deactivated.' 3
Subsequently, Webber was indicted by a grand jury, charging
her with one count of first-degree arson. 14 At trial, the state
presented two expert witnesses in the field of fire cause and origin,
John B. Fiore (Fiore) and Thomas Haynes (Haynes). i s Fiore testified that, on the day following the fire, a member of the Connecticut State Police, along with his dog, Matty, assisted in the
investigation.' 6 Fiore further testified that Matty "was trained to
detect the presence of flammable substances used as fire accelerants."' 7 Neither the dog's trainer, nor the Connecticut State Police
officer testified at trial.' s
Webber never contested the investigator's conclusion that the
fire was deliberately set through the use of accelerants. 19 Instead,
she argued that the presence of these accelerants had no direct relevance without first establishing a connection between her and the
fire. 2 0 Therefore, the decisive moment in the trial occurred when
2
the state attempted to link Webber with the accelerants. '
That decisive moment occurred when Fiore testified about an
incident he witnessed approximately twenty hours after the fire
originated. 2 2 According to Fiore, the following day the investigators asked Webber to consent to a search of her automobile, which
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id. At the time of trial, Fiore was an investigator for the Rhode Island
State Fire Marshall's office, while Haynes was a certified fire marshal and a chief
on the Coventry Fire Department. See id. Webber stipulated that both individuals were qualified as experts in the field of fire cause and origin. See id.
16. See id. This testimony went without objection from Webber. See id.
17. Id. Fiore testified that upon detecting flammable accelerants, Matty
would alert his handler by sitting down and scratching the area where the accelerants were. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 739-40.
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she did. 23 Shortly thereafter, Fiore testified that Matty, upon entering the automobile, alerted his handler to the presence of accel24 It
erant on the driver-side front floor mat in Webber's vehicle.
was at this point that counsel for Webber strenuously objected to
the introduction of any evidence concerning the dog's reaction to
25
the floor mat.

The trial justice permitted Fiore to further testify concerning
Matty's reaction, determining that the probative value outweighed
its potentially prejudicial effect. 26 Furthermore, the trial justice
permitted Fiore to testify that "after Webber observed7 Matty's
2
alert to the floor mat she became emotional and cried."
After trial, the jury deliberated and found Webber guilty of
first-degree arson. 28 Webber was sentence by the trial justice to
fifteen years at the Adult Correctional Institutions, five years to
serve and ten years suspended, and ten years probation upon her
release. 2 9 Webber filed a timely appeal to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court.
23. See id. at 740.
24. See id. Fiore recalled how Matty stopped, sat, and scratched the front
floor mat, thereby alerting his handler of the presence of fire accelerant. See id.
25. See id. In part, Webber's counsel stated:
It's a twofold problem involved with Mr. Fiore. This is not his dog. It's a
dog brought in by [Trooper Lancellotti]. My argument concerning Mr. Fiore concerns the fact not only is this request not proffered by him or initiated as a result of his investigation, he merely happens to be just a
bystander to this fact. So insofar as Mr. Fiore is concerned, I would assert
that particular point. And restricting him from testifying as to what this
dog may or may not have done-keep in mind that we're getting the connection now to the automobile and the house. What happened in the
house, and whatever accelerants were discovered, to me has no direct relevance insofar as Christine Webber is concerned, except for the fact that
there may be a nexus to the car and the mats.
That brings us to the second part of the problem that I discussed at the
outset of this case-contamination of the evidence. That is the general
difficulty I have with allowing this witness.., to testify that on September 14 .

.

. 22 hours after individuals had arrived at the scene and [had

access to Webber's car, including Fiore] some period of time after the fire,
bearing witness not as the handler of the dog, not as the expert, but someone who bore witness as to what the dog did, and what the dog may have
disclosed. I think it's too remote for this particular witness on [sic] this
context to be able to testify.
Id. at 740.
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

On appeal, Webber contends that the trial justice erred in allowing Fiore to testify concerning Matty's actions, and defendant's
reaction, to the dog's alerting it's handler to the presence of fire
accelerant.3 0 According to the Court, the issues presented by Webber on appeal require an interpretation of Rule of Evidence 702.31
The problem with the testimony regarding Matty's reactions
rests upon the foundation the State provided. 3 2 Under Rule of Evidence 702, a foundation is required in order to qualify any witness
as an expert, thereby allowing them to provide their opinion regarding the matter at issue. 3 3 Both Fiore and Haynes were qualified as experts by the state in the field of fire cause and origin;
however, according to the court, both "exceeded their area of exper34
tise" when they testified regarding Matty's reactions.
In order for the State to present evidence concerning Matty's
activities, the court determined that it was necessary to "establish
the expertise of Matty's curator, Matty's background and training,
and Matty's general accuracy during investigations." 35 Only
Matty's trainer or curator could provide such testimony, therefore,
the state's failure to call Trooper Lancellotti precluded any such
testimony.3 6 Therefore, according to the court, "[tihe state's failure
to establish this foundation constitutes prejudicial error and pro37
vides a sufficient basis" for a reversal of Webber's conviction.
While the state's failure to provide foundational basis for
Matty's activities was sufficient within itself to warrant a reversal
of Webber's conviction, the court also raised two related issues it
deemed important. 38 The first related issue concerns Fiore's testi30. See id.
31. See id. at 741. Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a wit-

ness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of fact or opinion.
Id.
32. See Webber, 716 A.2d at 741.
33. See id. (citing Rodriquez v. Kennedy, 706 A.2d 922, 924 (R.I. 1998); State
v. Wheeler, 496 A-2d 1382, 1388 (R.I. 1985)).
34. Id.
35. Id. (citing State v. Buller, 517 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Iowa 1994)).
36. See id.
37. Id.

38. See id.
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mony regarding Webber's emotional outburst upon witnessing
Matty detect accelerant on the floor mat in her automobile. 39 According to both the trial justice and the supreme court, whether to
allow such testimony under Rule of Evidence 403, was "a close
call."40 This ruling is difficult due to the inferences created by the
outburst. 41 Although the state contended it introduced the testimony to demonstrate Webber's state of mind, the court was of the
opinion that "this testimony also had the effect of establishing the
fact that a flammable accelerant was present on the driver's floor
mat and, furthermore, that Webber was responsible for its presence."4 2 Thus, concluded the court, when considering all the circumstances of this case, the probative value of such testimony was
43
outweighed by the inference theory the state attempted to prove.
The second related issue the court chose to discuss before remanding the case to the superior court was Webber's claim that
Haynes had bolstered testimony regarding the dog." At trial,
Haynes testified that "the dog was more sensitive than the gas
chromatograph" that was later used at the University of Rhode Island crime lab and failed to detect the presence of any accelerant. 45
This, according to Webber, constitutes a bolstering of Matty's actions, and encroaches on the finder of fact's exclusive territory of
determining a witness' credibility.4 6 The court agreed with Webber's contention that such testimony amounted to impermissible
47
bolstering.
CONCLUSION

As a result of State v. Webber, in order to present testimony of
any arson-detecting dog, a proper foundation must be laid pursuant to Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 702. In order to lay such a
proper foundation, it is necessary for the dog's curator or handler
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. See id. Of particular importance to the court was that when the driver's
floor mat was sent to the University of Rhode Island crime lab, it tested negative
for fire accelerant. See id. at 742.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
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to testify concerning their own expertise in the field, as well as the
dog's background, training and general accuracy during
investigations.
Christopher E. Friel

